

## Message Text

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3.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, TU  
SUBJ: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REF: STATE 167901 (DTG 010215Z JUL 78)

FOLLOWING IS THE FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY. PARAGRAPH ARE KEYED TO  
THE POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL.

1. US SECURITY ASSISTANCE INTERESTS IN TURKEY AND  
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SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES.

A. US SECURITY ASSISTANCE INTERESTS. THE OVERRIDING  
US POLICY OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN TURKEY'S STABILITY,  
DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT, AND ITS WESTERN ORIENTATION.  
SPECIFIC US POLICY GOALS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AS  
RELATED TO TURKEY ARE TO ENHANCE THE VIABILITY OF

NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK AND TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE AND EFFECTIVE TURKISH MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN NATO. TURKEY'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AS A POTENTIAL BLOCK TO THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST IS SELF-EVIDENT, AND TURKEY AFFORDS A GOOD LOCATION FOR US-OPERATED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. THE US ALSO HAS A STRONG INTEREST IN DECREASING TENSIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE, BOTH NATO ALLIES, AND IN ACHIEVING PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTES IN THE AEGEAN IS IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF PRESERVING US MILITARY ACCESS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, THE AEGEAN AND BLACK SEA, AND IN STRENGTHENING NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK. US ACCESS TO TURKISH SEAPORTS, NAMELY FOR SIXTH FLEET SHIPS, AND AIRSPACE IS RELATED TO US STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE REGION. (FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES, PLEASE SEE ANKARA 1231 NOTAL)

B. SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES.

(1) ASSIST TURKEY IN DEVELOPING ARMED FORCES CAPABLE OF RESISTING EXTERNAL AGGRESSION FROM THE USSR AND WARSAW PACT, AND CONTRIBUTING TO A REGIONAL DEFENSE IN CONSONANCE WITH NATO PLANS AND FORCE OBJECTIVES, WITHIN CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.

(2) ENCOURAGE MODERNIZATION OF TURKISH ARMED  
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FORCES, WITH EMPHASIS ON GROUND COMBAT FORCES WITH ASSIGNED NATO MISSIONS.

(3) ASSIST TURKISH ARMED FORCES IN IMPROVING COMBAT  
READINESS.

(4) ASSIST TURKEY IN DEVELOPING A LOGISTICAL  
SUPPORT CAPABILITY WITH MANPOWER MOBILIZATION BASE CAPABLE  
OF MEETING THREATS TO THE CENTO AREA.

(5) ASSIST TURKEY IN MAKING THE TRANSITION TO  
SELF-RELIANCE FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE WITH EMPHASIS ON IMPROVE-  
MENT IN RESOURCE-MANAGEMENT, LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION, SUPPLY  
PROCEDURE AND MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

(6) PROMOTE OPTIMUM UTILIZATION OF US GOVERNMENT  
PROVIDED SECURITY ASSISTANCE MATERIEL AND SERVICES.

(7) FOSTER FAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED  
STATES AND ITS POLICIES AND INFLUENCE TURKEY TO PURSUE  
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH UNITED STATES FOREIGN  
POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGY.

(8) ASSIST IN OBTAINING AND MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS AT KEY LOCATIONS FOR US AND ALLIED FORCES AND DENYING THEM TO THE FORCES OPPOSED TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS.

(9) SUPPORT AND IMPROVE TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NATO, CENTO, AND US-TURKISH BILATERAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EXERCISES.

(10) ENCOURAGE, WITHIN ARMS TRANSFER POLICY GUIDELINES, PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT TO ENHANCE NATO INTEROPERABILITY, STANDARDIZATION, AND NATIONALIZATION.

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(11) MAINTAIN A RELATIVE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND GREEK ARMED FORCES AND CREATE A CLIMATE FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WHICH WILL STABILIZE THE REGION AND PERMIT NEGOTIATION OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES.

(12) ENCOURAGE A CLOSER PLANNING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCIES AND US ELEMENTS OF NATO COMMANDS TO EFFECT BETTER EXCHANGE OF IDEAS, PRIORITIZATION OF GOALS AND INSURE UNITY OF GUIDANCE TO THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES.

2. PRESENT AND FUTURE THREAT. AS A NATO AND CENTO ALLY, THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF TURKEY'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IS DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACK FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT

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PERCEIVES THAT, BECAUSE OF ITS MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND  
BECAUSE OF THE PROCESSES OF EAST-WEST DETENTE, THE DANGER  
OF ATTACK BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES PRESENTLY IS  
REDUCED. TURKEY, MOREOVER, PERCEIVES A MORE IMMEDIATE BUT  
NOT OVERWHELMING MILITARY THREAT FROM GREECE, A BELIEF  
THAT IS LIKELY TO BE MAINTAINED UNTIL THERE IS A RESOLUTION  
OF TURKISH-GREEK DIFFERENCES IN THE AEGEAN, A CYPRUS  
SETTLEMENT, AND GREEK REINTEGRATION INTO THE NATO MILITARY  
STRUCTURE. TURKEY IS THEREFORE PREPARED TO DEFEND WHAT IT  
CONSIDERS TO BE ITS LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INTERESTS IN  
THE AEGEAN AND TO PROTECT THE TURKISH POPULATION ON CYPRUS.  
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SYRIA, IRAQ AND IRAN DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE DESIGNS ON  
TURKISH TERRITORY, ALTHOUGH A RESURGENCE OF ETHNIC AND  
RELIGIOUS DISSIDENCE IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY COULD RESULT  
IN STRAINED RELATIONS WITH ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES,  
AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL LAW-AND-ORDER DIFFICULTIES.  
INTERNAL CIVIL VIOLENCE, OCCASIONED BY POLITICAL CONFLICTS  
BETWEEN RIGHT AND LEFT EXTREMISTS, CONTINUES TO BE A  
PROBLEM BUT THE SITUATION HAS NOT BECOME EXACERBATED AS  
TO WARRANT THE USE OF MILITARY (AS OPPOSED TO POLICE AND  
PARA-MILITARY) FORCES.

### 3. MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT.

A. GENERAL. AS NOTED ABOVE, A PRINCIPAL US OBJECTIVE  
WITH RESPECT TO TURKEY IS TO MAINTAIN THE TURKISH  
GOVERNMENT'S POSITIVE ADHERENCE TO THE NATO AND CENTO  
ALLIANCES, THE BASIS OF WHICH IS COMMON DEFENSE AGAINST THE

WARSAW PACT THREAT. IT IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE FOR TURKEY TO MODULATE ITS POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES BUT OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT, AS LONG AS TURKEY IS POLITICALLY ALIGNED WITH NATO AND TURKEY BELIEVES THAT A TANGIBLE RETURN IS GAINED FROM THIS ALLIANCE TIE, A DRASTIC SHIFT IN TURKISH DEFENSE POLICY FROM A WESTERN TO EASTERN ORIENTATION IS NOT FORESEEN. TURKEY'S PERCEIVED PROBLEMS WITH GREECE, INCLUDING THOSE CONCERNING CYPRUS, HAVE THEIR OWN DYNAMICS AND IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THE TURKS COULD BE DISLODGED FROM THEIR ASSESSMENT THAT GREECE POSES A MILITARY THREAT IN THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS AS NOTED ABOVE. NEVERTHELESS, THE US AND OTHER NATO ALLIES CAN PLAY A MODERATING ROLE IN TURKISH-GREEK PROBLEMS AND IT IS IN THIS AREA THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS PROVIDE A DEGREE OF LEVERAGE WITH BOTH COUNTRIES.

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B. SPECIFIC. THE USSR WILL CONTINUE TO POSE THE MOST SERIOUS EXTERNAL THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF TURKEY. A TRADITIONAL ENEMY OF TURKEY AND LONG COVETOUS OF THE TURKISH STRAITS, THE USSR POSSESSES THE MILITARY POWER TO CARRY OUT AN OVERWHELMING UNILATERAL ATTACK AGAINST TURKEY. AS LONG AS TURKEY REMAINS A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THAT A SOVIET ATTACK WOULD BE MADE EXCEPT AS PART OF AN OVERALL ASSAULT BY THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS AGAINST NATO. THIS ATTACK WOULD MOST LIKELY BE COMPOSED OF 300 BOMBERS AND 650 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT OVER THE WHOLE OF TURKEY; 30 ARMY DIVISIONS IN THE WEST AND 18 DIVISIONS IN THE EAST; AND BLACK SEA NAVAL UNITS WITH 15 MAJOR COMBATANTS, 40 MISSILE BOATS, 80 TORPEDO BOATS AND 18 AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS WITH ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF CAPABILITY CARRYING ONE MECHANIZED DIVISION. THE WARSAW PACT POSSESSES THE CAPABILITY FOR A MORE MASSIVE ATTACK IF IT IS DIRECTED AGAINST TURKEY ALONE. THE BULGARIANS ARE CAPABLE OF INITIATING A UNILATERAL ATTACK AGAINST TURKEY TO OCCUPY "BULGARIAN" THRACE; HOWEVER, SUCH AN ATTACK, WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, IS UNLIKELY.

4. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT, SINCE ITS INAUGURATION IN JANUARY 1978, HAS DECLARED ITS INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT A "NEW DEFENSE CONCEPT" WHICH, TO THE EXTENT ITS DETAILS ARE KNOWN OR EVEN DEFINED BY THE GOVT, EMPHASIZES TURKEY'S "NATIONAL" DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS (IE, THE PERCEIVED THREAT FROM GREECE, THE NEED TO BE ABLE TO COUNTER INTERNAL DISSIDENCE IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY) OVER NATO'S COMMON DEFENSE. ADDITIONALLY, GOVT OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THAT TURKEY'S ARMED FORCES NEED TO BE STREAMLINED AND MODERNIZED. SPECIFICALLY, IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT MORE

EMPHASIS NEEDS TO BE PLACED ON IMPROVING FORCE READINESS  
AND FIREPOWER. TURKEY CURRENTLY MAINTAINS ARMED FORCES OF  
ABOUT 600,000 MEN, PRIMARILY BASED ON MANDATORY CONSCRIPTION.

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WHILE THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO MEET THE  
THREAT TO NATO, THE PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE IS INFLUENCED  
BY THE PERCEIVED GREEK THREAT AND ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS.  
ACCORDINGLY, TURKEY EMPHASIZES A MODERN AIR FORCE AND  
LARGE SHIP NAVY CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING THE AEGEAN AT THE  
EXPENSE OF NEEDED MODERNIZATION OF THE GROUND FORCES. THIS  
ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES REVERSES THE PRIORTIES WHICH  
SUPPORT OF NATO REQUIRMENTS WOULD MANDATE.

5. FORCE ASSESSMENT.

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A. GENERAL. WHILE THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT'S "NEW DEFENSE CONCEPT" ARE OPEN TO ARGUMENT, ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD FORCE RATIONALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION IS COMMENDABLE. GIVEN THE PROSPECTS FOR ONLY MODERATE INPUTS OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE COMING YEARS AND THE CURRENT UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY, THE TURKS MUST MAKE PROCUREMENT CHOICES WISELY, MAXIMIZE THE UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM ALL SOURCES (NOTABLY THE FRG IN ADDITION TO THE U.S.), AND RESTRUCTURE THEIR ARMED FORCES SO AS TO ENABLE THEM TO MEET NATO FORCE GOALS IN THE MOST ECONOMICAL WAY POSSIBLE. THE MOST IMPORTANT DECISION THAT THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS) SHOULD MAKE WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMED FORCES IS TO EMPHASIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARMY WITHIN THE OVERALL BALANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE ARMY IS THE MOST CRITICAL BRANCH OF SERVICE WITH RESPECT TO TURKEY'S VALUE TO THE NATO ALLIANCE. WHILE THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE CAN BE MORE READILY AUGMENTED FROM OTHER NATO RESOURCES, TURKEY, BY VIRTUE OF ITS DISTANT PROXIMITY TO WESTERN EUROPE, ITS POOR INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, AND THE GENERAL NON-AVAILABILITY OF SIGNIFICANT ALLIED LAND FORCES FROM NATO, CANNOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE GROUND REINFORCEMENTS DURING THE CRITICAL EARLY PHASES OF ANY INVASION BY WARSAW PACT FORCES. INTEGRAL TO THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKS'S OPTIMIZING U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS THE REESTABLISHMENT OF A PLANNING DIALOGUE WITH THE ARMED SERVICES WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO INFLUENCE TURKISH WEAPONS PROCUREMENT AND FORCE

B. SPECIFIC FORCE CAPABILITIES.

(1) ARMY.

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(A) THE LARGE TURKISH ACTIVE ARMY IS OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSISTS OF ABOUT 485,000 MEN IN 16 DIVISIONS AND 20 SEPARATE MANEUVER BRIGADES WITH ASSIGNED STRENGTH AT LESS THAN 70 PERCENT OF AUTHORIZED. LESS THAN 10 PERCENT (ESTIMATES VARY FROM 4 TO 7 PERCENT) ARE REGULARS AND THE REMAINDER ARE CONSCRIPTS SERVING FROM 20 MONTHS. THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY LIES IN THE MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE REQUIREMENT WHICH PROVIDES A LARGE ACTIVE FORCE AND A VAST RESERVE OF TRAINED MANPOWER. THE WEAKNESS IS THAT THE TURKISH ARMY IS CURRENTLY A GRANT AID ARMY, SUPPLIED WITH U.S. EQUIPMENT THAT HAS BECOME, OR SOON WILL BECOME, OBSOLETE AND LOGISTICALLY NON-SUPPORTABLE FROM

U.S. DOD SUPPLY SOURCES. THE TURKISH ARMY LACKS:  
ADEQUATE WAR RESERVE STOCKS, EFFECTIVE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS  
SYSTEMS, A MODERN AND SUPPORTABLE TANK FORCE, SUFFICIENT  
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS TO EQUIP ALL MECHANIZED UNITS,  
MODER SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY, AND EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENSE  
SYSTEM AND SUFFICIENT MODERN TACTICAL RADIOS WITH WHICH TO  
EXERCISE COMMAND AND CONTROL ON THE BATTLEFIELD. COM-  
POUNDING THE NONSUPPORTABILITY PROBLEM IS THE ACUTE  
SHORTAGE OF REPAIR PARTS TO SUPPORT ORDNANCE, SIGNAL,  
ENGINEER, QUARTERMASTER AND AVIATION AND ITMES CURRENTLY  
ON HAND. THE THREE YEAR OLD ARMS EMBARGO HAS COMPOUNDED  
THE LATTER PROBLEM, AND FORESTALLED MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS  
THAT WOULD HAVE HELPED TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM. WITHOUT  
LARGE AMOUNTS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES,  
THE TURKISH ARMY WILL BE UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH MODERNIZATION  
PROGRAMS OR, AT WORST, TO SUSTAIN THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF THE OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, THE TURKISH  
ARMY WOULD BE INCAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHING ITS NATO MISSIONS.

(B) TO ENHANCE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, THE  
ARMY SHOULD BE RESTRUCTURED ALONG THE LINES OF "HEAVY"  
UNITS AND "LIGHT" UNITS. HEAVY UNITS WOULD MAXIMIZE THE  
USE OF TANKS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, LONG AND MEDIUM  
RANGE ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES AND MODERNIZED ARTILLERY.  
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LIGHT UNITS WOULD MAXIMIZE LONG AND MEDIUM RANGE ANTI-TANK

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GUIDED MISSILES, TOWED ARTILLERY AND WHEELED TRANSPORTATION.  
BOTH TYPE UNITS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH HAND-HELD AIR  
DEFENSE WEAPONS. THIS MODERNIZATION AND FORCE RESTRUCTURING  
PROGRAM WOULD BE DIRECTED AT ONLY A SELECTED PORTION OF THE  
FORCE INITIALLY, AND ONCE THIS SEGMENT IS FULLY MODERNIZED,  
THEN THE NEXT SEGMENT WOULD BE DONE. IN THIS WAY, THE  
CURRENT FORCE WOULD REMAIN ACTIVE AND AS NEW EQUIPMENT IS  
PHASED INTO THE MODERNIZED UNITS, OLDER BUT SERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT  
COULD BE PASSED ON TO LESS WELL EQUIPPED UNITS  
TO REPLACE OBSOLETE AND NONSUPPORTABLE EQUIPMENT.

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(2) NAVY. THE TURKISH NAVY IS ONLY marginally  
CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS NATO MISSION, LIMITED PRIMARILY  
BY LACK OF SUFFICIENT MODERN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS  
SYSTEMS. THE MAJORITY OF THE NAVY'S WEAPONS SYSTEMS ARE  
OBSOLETE OR OBSOLESCE, AND AN EXTENSIVE MODERNIZATION  
PROGRAM IS REQUIRED. PREDOMINANT IN THIS MODERNIZATION IS  
A GROWING FLEET OF FAST PATROL BOATS EQUIPPED (OR TO BE  
EQUIPPED) WITH ANTI-SHIP MISSILES WHICH PROMISES TO ENHANCE  
EFFECTIVENESS IN DEFENSE OF THE STRAITS, COASTAL DEFENSE  
AND BLACK SEA OPERATIONS. A MODERATE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM  
IS UNDER WAY WHICH IS EXPECTED TO MAKE SOME IMPROVEMENTS  
IN OVERALL CAPABILITIES IN THE NEAR TERM, HOWEVER, THIS  
PROGRAM HAS BEEN HAMPERED BY THE US EMBARGO AND LOW  
FUNDING LEVELS. CURRENTLY, NAVY'S MOST EFFECTIVE COMBAT  
ARM IS THE SUBMARINE FORCE; ITS LEAST EFFECTIVE IS  
MARITIME AIR, CONSISTING OF A SMALL NUMBER OF OUTDATED  
AIRCRAFT WITH CAPABILITY LIMITED TO SURFACE SURVEILLANCE,  
CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, AND RUDIMENTARY ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE  
(ASW). THE NAVY HAS SUFFICIENT MINES TO ACCOMPLISH THE  
NATT MINE PLAN, BUT DUE TO A SHORTFALL IN MINELAYERS, THE

OPERATION WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE IN EXCESS OF TWO WEEKS. THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE ANTI-AIR DEFENSE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS IN A SERIOUS DEFICIENCY WHICH IMPOSES A HIGH RISK TO ALL SURFACE OPERATIONS AND UNITS. SERIOUS WEAKNESSES EXIST IN COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL, BOTH IN EQUIPMENT AND IN DOCTRINE. SOME SHORTFALLS IN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ARE BEING REDUCED BY FMS PURCHASES. THE FLEET OF FOURTEEN DESTROYERS ARE FOR THE MOST PART OBSOLESCE, BUT IN A NON-HOSTILE AIR ENVIRONMENT, IT IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT MISSIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT, ASW, SHORE BOMBARDMENT, AND NON-MISSILE ANTI-SHIP OPERATIONS ON A LEVEL COMPARABLE WITH THAT OF NON-MISSILE

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EQUIPPED US DESTROYERS. SURVIVABILITY OF THE DESTROYERS IS, HOWEVER, CONSIDERED VERY LOW DUE TO INADEQUATE ANTI-AIR DEFENSE.

(3) AIR FORCE. THE TURKISH AIR FORCES COMMAND (TAF) CONTINUES TO BE HAMPERED BY AN AIRCRAFT INVENTORY COMPOSED LARGELY OF OBSOLETE OR OBSOLESCEING AIRCRAFT, UNIT EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES, SERIOUS SHORTAGES OF WEAPON SYSTEM AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SPARES, INADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL RESOURCES, INSUFFICIENT MODERN MUNITIONS, AN ABSENCE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) CAPABILITIES, AND MARGINALLY EFFECTIVE LOGISTICS SUPPORT SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH TAF ENJOYS THE BENEFITS OF BASICALLY WELL TRAINED AND MOTIVATED PERSONNEL, CURRENT DEFICIENCIES, CONTINUING RESTRICTIONS ON US SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINTS SEVERELY LIMIT TAF'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IN A MODERN AIR COMBAT ENVIRONMENT. BEING AWARE OF THESE DEFICIENCIES, TAF IS PURSUING AMBITIOUS MODERNIZATION PLANS TO ACQUIRE MODERN AIRCRAFT, MUNITIONS AND EQ EQUIPMENT; TO IMPROVE ITS COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM; AND TO ENHANCE ITS LOGISTICS SUPPORT CAPACITY. HOWEVER, SHOULD CURRENT US FMS RESTRICTIONS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINTS PERSIST, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT TAF MODERNIZATION PLANS CAN BE CARRIED OUT AT A PACE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE TAF'S OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN A NATO-WARSAW PACT CONFLICT IN THE 1980'S.

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#### 6. DEFENSE SPENDING IN TURKEY'S ECONOMY

TOTALING TL 52.9 BILLION (US \$2.1 BILLION), APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ACCOUNT FOR ALMOST ONE-FIFTH OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES PROJECTED IN TURKEY'S 1978 BUDGET (MARCH 1, 1978-FEBRUARY 28, 1979). THIS REPRESENTS AN INCREASE OF ABOUT 25 PERCENT IN NOMINAL TERMS OVER 1977 BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS; HOWEVER, GIVEN CURRENT RATES OF INFLATION (ABOUT 65 PCT. ON ANNUAL BASIS), THIS EXPENDITURE LEVEL WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL DECREASE IN REAL TERMS IN THE ABSENCE OF SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS.

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DEFENSE EXPENDITURES WOULD REPRESENT ABOUT 6 PERCENT OF TURKEY'S 1978 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AS PROJECTED IN THE ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. SINCE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AVERAGED 4.5 PERCENT OF GNP DURING THE 1971-1977 PERIOD, 1978'S PROJECTED EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENT OF NOMINAL GNP; HOWEVER, EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON GNP WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN A DECREASE IN SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF REAL GNP.

THE TURKISH BUDGET DOES NOT HAVE LINE ITEMS WHICH DISTINGUISH MILITARY IMPORTS FROM LOCALLY PROCURED GOODS AND SERVICES; HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING LINE-ITEM BREAKDOWN DOES PROVIDE A CLUE TO POSSIBLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURES:

1978 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUDGET

| LINE-ITEM | BUDGETED EXPENDITURE<br>(MILLIONS OF TL) | U.S. DOLLAR<br>EQUIVALENT (MILL-<br>IONS) AT \$1.00<br>EQUALS TL 25.00 |
|-----------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|-----------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                    |          |            |
|------------------------------------|----------|------------|
| 1) GENERAL STAFF EXPENDITURES      | 888.9    | \$ 35.6    |
| 2) WAR POWER AND SERVICES OF WHICH | 43,971.1 | \$ 1,758.8 |

|                                               |           |        |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|--------|
| - PERSONNEL EXPENDITURES                      | 11,114.5  | 444.6  |
| - TRAVEL EXPENSES                             | 272.1     | 10.9   |
| -SERVICE PURCHASES                            | 1,256.7   | 50.3   |
| -PURCHASES OF CONSUMER<br>GOODS AND EQUIPMENT | 22,883.4  | 915.3  |
| OF WHICH POL                                  | (2,064.7) | (82.6) |
| PURCHASES RELATED<br>SECRET                   |           |        |

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|                                   |            |         |
|-----------------------------------|------------|---------|
| TO DEFENSE                        | (11,452.6) | (458.1) |
| PURCHASES OF SPECIAL<br>EQUIPMENT | (3,142.3)  | (125.7) |
| -FURNITURE & FIXTURES             | 133.4      | 5.3     |
| - OTHER                           | 21.2       | .8      |
| -DEFENSE INVESTMENTS              | 8,128.8    | 325.2   |

|                 |         |       |
|-----------------|---------|-------|
| 3) REMO PROGRAM | 8,000.0 | 320.0 |
|-----------------|---------|-------|

|                       |          |            |
|-----------------------|----------|------------|
| TOTAL (1,2, AND 3) TL | 52,860.0 | \$ 2,114.4 |
|-----------------------|----------|------------|

IF ONE ASSUMES THAT 85 TO 90 PCT. OF THE EXPENDITURES CONTAINED IN THE LINE ITEMS UNDER "PURCHASES OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT" AND THE REORGANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES ("REMO PROGRAM") REQUIRE EXPENDITURES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR IMPORTED EQUIPMENT, THIS TOTAL WOULD ROUGHLY CORRESPOND WITH THE PROJECTION MADE IN THE 1977 TURKISH DEFENSE PROCUREMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (DPQ) TO NATO OF \$800 MILLION IN MILITARY PURCHASES ABROAD IN 1978. IF THIS IS ACCURATE, THEN ABOUT 16 PERCENT OF TURKEY'S ESTIMATED 1978 IMPORTS WOULD REPRESENT MILITARY PURCHASES.

BASED ON CURRENT PROJECTIONS, ABOUT \$500 MILLION IN TURKEY'S 1978 IMPORTS CANNOT BE FINANCED WITHOUT RUNNING UP ARREARS IN

CURRENT TRANSACTIONS, WHICH IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE CURRENT IMF AGREEMENT. FAILURE TO ACQUIRE THIS FINANCING COULD FORCE A REDUCTION IN IMPORTS FROM \$5 BILLION TO \$4.5 BILLION. THE PRIORITIES OF THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES WILL DETERMINE WHETHER ANY FOREIGN MILITARY PURCHASES CURRENTLY HAVE PRIORITY ACCESS TO AVAILABLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE.

TURKEY'S DEBT SERVICE POSITION IS BAD AND CAN ONLY GET WORSE. THE GOVERNMENT IS IN THE PROCESS OF REFINANCING AND RESCHEDULING DEBTS TOTALING ABOUT \$5 BILLION OVER THE NEXT SEVERN YEARS. PROSPECTS FOR A RAPID INCREASE IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS SUFFICIENT TO COVER TURKEY'S CHRONIC CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT  
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AND SERVICE ITS DEBT ARE NOT GOOD. IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT TURKEY WILL HAVE TO RESCHEDULE ITS DEBT IN FUTURE YEARS.

7. PROJECTION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES LIKELY TO BE SOUGHT FROM THE U.S. BY GOT DURING THE YEARS FY 1980, 81, AND 82. SEE TABLE D-1, MSAP 1980-84, TURKEY SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AS AMENDED BY CJUSMMAT 031345Z APR 78 (MSAP UPDATE, FY 1980).

8. ASSESSMENT OF ITEMS PROJECTD. ASSESSMENT (JUSTIFICATION) IS AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE, AND FOOTNOTES TO TABLE D-1 OF THE 1980-84 MSAP, AS UPDATED BY CJUSMMAT 031345Z APR 78.

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08  
MCE-00 DLOS-09 /120 W  
-----012243 211754Z /41

R 211315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2703  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN

SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
CSA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES  
DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

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#### 9. ECONOMIC IMPACT

TURKEY'S FINANCIAL POSITION IS PRECARIOUS. ITS GROSS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES (\$718 MILLION) ARE BARELY SUFFICIENT TO COVER SIX WEEK'S IMPORTS. SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES OF THE CENTRAL BANK (THOSE FALLING DUE WITHIN A YEAR) ARE SO LARGE (\$4.1 BILLION) THAT THE COUNTRY'S NET FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE POSITION IS A NEGATIVE \$3.4 BILLION. TURKEY CAN NEITHER GENERATE THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS, NOR OBTAIN FINANCING SUFFICIENT BOTH TO PAY OFF THESE SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES AND COVER ITS PROJECTED 1978 CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT OF \$1.6 BILLION.

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FACED WITH THIS SITUATION, TURKEY HAS REACHED AN AGREEMENT TO RESCHEDULE OFFICIAL DEBTS AND SOME GOVERNMENT GUARANTEED PRIVATE DEBTS OWED TO OECD GOVERNMENTS AND IS NEGOTIATING TO TRANSFORM \$2.5 BILLION IN SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES OWED TO COMMERCIAL BANKS INTO LONGER-TERM LIABILITIES. THIS DEBT RESCHEDULING, HOWEVER, ONLY POSTPONES TURKEY'S CURRENT DIFFICULTIES FOR A FEW YEARS. AS THIS RESCHEDULED DEBT BEGINS TO FALL DUE IN 1981, ALMOST 60 PERCENT OF TURKEY'S PROJECTED EXPORT EARNINGS WILL BE NEEDED FOR DEBT SERVICE. SINCE TURKEY CANNOT SUPPORT SUCH A DEBT SERVICE BURDEN, IT IS ALMOST A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT THE COUNTRY'S DEBTS WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE RESCHEDULED IN FUTURE YEARS.

THIS BLEAK FINANCIAL PICTURE COMBINED WITH THE CRITICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR UPGRADING THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES ARGUES FOR THE USE OF MAP AND IMET PROGRAMS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, FMS CREDITS WOULD ALLOW THE GOT TO SPREAD OUT PAYMENTS FOR ESSENTIAL DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE REQUIRE EXPENDITURES OF CRITICALLY SHORT FOREIGN EXCHANGE.

ACQUISITION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEVICES OUTLINED IN

THE PROVIOUS SECTION WOULD INCREASE TURKEY'S FINANCIAL BURDENS;  
HOWEVER, THE DIFFERNCE IN TURKEY'S SELF-FINANCED REQUIRE-  
MENTS BETWEEN THE LEVEL ONE AND LEVEL THREE PROGRAMS \$193.9  
MILLION IN FY 80, \$224.1 MILLION IN FY 81, AND \$237.0 MILLION  
IN FY 82), IS RELATIVELY SMALL IN COMPARISON WITH ITS OVERALL  
OBLIGATIONS. THE INCREASEIN THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE  
TURKISH ARMED FORCES TO BE GAINED FROM A LEVLE THREE PROGRAM  
MIGHT WELL OUTWEIGH THE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BURDEN IT  
CREATES. HOWEVER, TURKEY'S WEAK FINANCIAL POSITION MAKES  
THE INCREASED TURKISH FINANCING NECESSARY TO OBTAIN THE  
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INCREMENTAL (LEVEL 4) PROGRAM HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

TURKEY'S FOURTH FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN CALLS FOR TL 1.5  
TRILLION (US \$60 BILLION) IN FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENTS TO BE  
MADE IN THE 1979-1983 PERIOD. THIS ANNUAL AVERAGE INVESTMENT  
OF THE EQUIVALENT OF \$15 BILLION IS PROBABLY NOT A REALISTIC  
OR ACHIEVABLE GOAL; BUT COMPARED WITH THESE INVESTMENT PLANS,  
THE SIZE OF EVEN A LEVEL THREE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS  
MODEST, TOTALING A MIZIMUM OF 6 PERCENT OF THE PLANNED INVEST-  
MENT PROGRAM. THE MAXIMUM SELF-FINANCED COST OF A LEVEL  
THREE PROGRAM IS ONLY 4 PERCENT OF THE PLANNED PROGRAM. THE  
IMPACT OF THE LEVEL THREE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ON  
TURKEY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS IS RELATIVELY MODEST.  
WHILE REDUCTIONS TO LEVEL TWO AND LEVEL ONE PROGRAMS  
WILL REDUCE THE STRAIN ON TURKEY'S ALREADY OVERBURDENED  
FINANCES, THE SAVINGS ARE INSIGNIFICANT IN TERMS OF ITS  
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08  
MCE-00 DLOS-09 /120 W  
-----012157 211754Z /41

R 211315Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2704  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
CSA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES

UVAAAA/DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

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10. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT: WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT TURKISH ACQUISITION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES AS PROJECTED FOR THE MINIMUM, INTERMEDIATE AND CURRENT PROGRAM LEVELS FOR FY 80, 81, AND 82 OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 13 BELOW, WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT ON THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION INASMUCH AS THE WEAPONS SYTEMS INVOLVED ARE COVERED UNDER EXISTING PROGRAMS AND TURKISH CAPABILITIES ARE LIMITED. HOWEVER, THE ACQUISITION OF A NEXT GENERATION OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (F-X) UNDER THE INCREMENTAL PROGRAM LEVEL (PARAGRAPH 13(E)(4)) COULD ALTER THE MILITARY BALANCE

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TURKISH AND GREEK AIR FORCES IN THE AEGEAN  
UNLESS BOTH AIR FORCES WERE SO EQUIPPED. IN LINE WITH USG POLICY AGAINST THE SALE OF ADVANCED (EG F-16) AIRCRAFT TO EITHER TRUKEY OR GREECE AT THIS TIME, WE DO NOT RECOMMEND THAT SUCH SALES BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED UNTIL POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE AEGEAN PERMIT, THERE IS SOME PROSPECT FOR THE RESOLUTION OF GREEK-TURKISH DIFFERENCES OF OVER AIR AND SEA BOUNDARIES, AND UNTIL GREECE IS REINTEGRATED INTO NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURE. WITH REGARD TO OTHER PRO- JECTED TURKISH EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE INCREMENTAL LEVEL PROGRAM WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PURCHASE OF THESE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT WOULD MAKE A QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE IN THE BALANCE OF GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES, NOR, BECAUSE OF PRESSING TURKISH EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS ACROSS-THE-BOARD AND THE GOT'S CONSTRAINED FINANCES, WOULD THERE BE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITITIVE CHANGES AS TO ALTER THE LAND AND SEA BALANCE OF FORCES. FINALLY, WE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVERSE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS VIS-A-VIS IRAN, IRAQ AND SYRIA WHOSE MILITARY MATERIEL CAPABILITIES EXCEED THOSE OF THE TURKS IN A NUMBER OF AREAS.



11. HUMAN RIGHTS

AS NOTED IN PREVIOUS EMBASSY REPORTING, TURKEY ENJOYS A LIVELY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN JUNE OF 1977 OPEN AND FREE ELECTIONS WERE HELD FOR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, AND IN DECEMBER MAYORAL, PROVINCIAL COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND OTHER LOCAL ELECTION CONTESTS WERE HELD WITH PARTIES FROM ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM COMPETING OPENLY.

TURKEY'S PRESS, WITH DAILY CIRCULATION IN ANKARA AND ISTANBUL ALONE TOPPING TWO MILLION, CONTINUES TO BE ACTIVE. WHILE PAPERS BACKING POLITICAL PARTIES OF ALL PERSUASIONS ARE REPRESENTED, TURKISH JOURNALISM HAS BEEN ENLIVENED OVER THE PAST YEAR BY THE  
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APPEARANCE OF A NEW MAOIST DAILY AND EXISTING LEFTIST-ORIENTED PAPERS WHICH SEEM TO OPENLY CHALLENGE EXISTING STATUTES (ARTICLES 141 AND 142 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE) WHICH ARE COMMONLY ACKNOWLEDGED AS PROHIBITING THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM OR CLASS CONFLICT IDEOLOGIES. IN THIS REGARD, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT TOLD REPORTERS DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE IN JUNE 1978 THAT HE FINDS CONTINUED PROSCRIPTION OF THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY AN ANOMALY OF TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE WHICH PROBABLY CANNOT BE CHANGED IN THE SHORT RUN BUT MAY BE CORRECTED IN THE FUTURE.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN THE ADVENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT WHICH PLACES A HIGH PRIORITY ON THE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ECEVIT HAS ADOPTED EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AS HIS PERSONAL POLITICAL MODEL AND IS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF TURKEY'S DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

PERHAPS PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO OUTSIDE CRITICISM OF ALLEGED GOT ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS TOWARD MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN TURKEY PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT MET SEPARATELY IN MARCH WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREEK AND ARMENIAN PATRIARCHATES IN ISTANBUL. ECEVIT LISTENED TO THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE MINORITY COMMUNITIES AND AGREED TO SEEK IMMEDIATE REMEDIES. HE ALSO ESTABLISHED A MINISTERIAL-LEVEL GROUP UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TO DEAL WITH MINORITY COMPLAINTS AND ASSURE THAT ACTION IS TAKEN. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS GREEK AND ARMENIAN COMMUNITY LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ECEVIT'S INITIATIVE AND HAVE INDICATED THAT MOVEMENT IS EVIDENT ON THEIR REQUESTS.

TURKEY CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECT TO MUCH UNFAIR THIRD PARTY CRITICISM WHICH IS BASED ON PAST ACTIONS RATHER THAN PRESENT REALITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, IRREDENTIST ARMENIAN GROUPS IN THE US

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08  
MCE-00 DLOS-09 /120 W

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R 211315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2705  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
CSA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES  
DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

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AND OTHER COUNTRIES STILL CARRY ON AN ANTI-TURKEISH CAMPAIGN  
BASED ON OTTOMAN EMPIRE MASSACRES BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR  
I. SINCE TURKEY'S 1974 CYPRUSINTERVENTION, GREEK GROUPS HAVE  
MOUNTED THEIR OWN ANTI-TURKISH CAMPAIGN IN WHICH THE COMPLEXITIES  
OF RECENT CYPRIOT HISTORY ARE IGNORED IN AN EFFORT TO PORTRAY  
TURKEY IN AS UNFAVORABLE LIGHT AS POSSIBLE. BOTH THE ARMENIAN AND  
GREEK CAMPAIGNS, IN WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS THEMES ARE STRONGLY STRESSED,  
APPARENTLY HAVE HAD SOME INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDES OF CONGRESS AND  
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TOWARD TURKEY. A CONTINUING ACCUSATION MADE  
BY GREEK CYPRIOTS SINCE 1974 IS THAT THE PRESENCE OF TURKISH  
MILITARY UNITS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS REPRESENTS AN ON-GOING  
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"OCCUPATION" OF 40 PCT. OF CYPRUS' LAND AREA. AS A CONCOMITANT, THE  
GREEK CYPRIOTS ARGUE THAT RESTRICTIONS ON REFUGEES' FREEDOM OF

MOVEMENT AND FREEDOM TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES REPRESENT A VIOLATION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. IN THEIR PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD IN APRIL 1978, THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY INDICATED THAT FREEDOM OF RETURN AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ARE ISSUES WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES LIVING ON THE ISLAND. PROGRESS IN INITIATING A NEW ROUND OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS HAS BEEN BLOCKED BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS AS AN ADEQUATE BASIS NOR BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ARE HINDERING THE RESUMPTION OF TALKS IN AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON ARMS TRANSFERS TO TURKEY.

IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT APPROVAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTES WILL DIRECTLY AFFECT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN TURKEY. THE DENIAL OF SUCH REQUESTS, HOWEVER, COULD HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON U.S. POLICY GOALS FOR TURKEY WHICH HAVE STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS. THESE GOALS INCLUDE A STABLE, DEMOCRATIC TURKEY CLOSELY TIED TO THE WEST AND FULLY INTEGRATED INTO NATO, THE RESTORATION OF A FIRM U.S./TURKEY SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, AND PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. FURTHERMORE, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT HAS INDICATED THAT THE CONTINUED DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY WILL BE MADE EASIER IF ECONOMIC ISSUES BECOME LESS PRESSING, AND DENIAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A WORSENING OF TURKEY'S ALREADY DESPERATE ECONOMIC PLIGHT.

12. A. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY SINCE 1963 (MILLIONS US \$)

| SOURCE | AMT. AUTHORIZED | AMT. IN PIPELINE |
|--------|-----------------|------------------|
| SECRET |                 |                  |

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TO BE DISBURSED AS  
OF DEC. 31, 1977

|                     |         |       |
|---------------------|---------|-------|
| AUSTRIA             | 0.29    | ---   |
| CANADA              | 259.4   | 121.8 |
| FRANCE              | 124.4   | 9.6   |
| WEST GERMAN         | 399.8   | 199.3 |
| ITALY               | 73.9    | ---   |
| NETHERLANDS         | 6.9     | ---   |
| SWEDEN              | 7.0     | ---   |
| SWITZERLAND         | 28.1    | ---   |
| UNITED STATES       | 732.5   | 32.0  |
| TOTAL OECD          |         |       |
| CONSORIUM COUNTRIES | 1,688.9 | 365.8 |
| JAPAN               | 85.3    | ---   |
| USSR                | 617.1   | 264.8 |

|                               |         |         |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|
| IRAN                          | 41.9    | 41.9    |
| WORLD BANK                    | 1,682.3 | 687.0   |
| EUROPEAN INVEST-<br>MENT BANK | 436.1   | 50.8    |
| GRAND TOTAL                   | 4,551.6 | 1,410.3 |

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08  
MCE-00 DLOS-09 /120 W  
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R 211315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2706  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
CSA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES  
DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

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12 B. EXTERNAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE

APART FROM THE US, THE FRG IS THE ONLY DONOR OF MILITARY  
ASSITANCE TO TURKEY. ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE INFORMATION,  
THE 10TH TRANCHE OF FRG MILITARY AID COVERING 1978-79  
WILL BE DM 100 MILLION; ADDITIONALLY, APPROXIMATELY DM 2.5  
BILLION IN UNSERVICEABLE MILITARY EQUIPMENT (LARGELY FOR  
CANNIBALIZATION BY THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES) WILL BE  
GIVEN TO TURKEY BY THE FRG BEGINNING IN MID-1978 OVER

AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME. TURKEY HAS NOT RECEIVED  
ANY MILITARY GRANT AID FROM OTHER SOURCES, ALTHOUGH A  
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FEW COUNTRIES SUCH AS ITALY HAVE REPORTEDLY OFFERED  
COMMERCIAL CREDITS ON CONCESSIONARY TERMS IN CONNECTION  
WITH THE PURCHASES OF SPECIFIC ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT. UNTIL  
THE ARMS EMBARGO IS LIFTED, NATO COUNTRIES ARE FOR  
THE MOST PART CONSTRAINED IN OFFERING EXCESS ARTICLES TO  
TURKEY BECAUSE OF THE ANNUAL FMS CEILING AND USG  
LIMITATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THIRD  
COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, THE TURKS EXPECT THAT, ONCE THE  
EMBARGO IS REPEALED, NATO NATIONS COLLECTIVELY WILL  
CONSIDER EARNESTLY THE PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO  
THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES. THE TURKS HAVE ALSO EVIDENCED  
CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN INVESTMENT BY THE US, FRG AND  
OTHER COUNTRIES IN TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, THE EXPORT  
OF MILITARY ITEMS (SUCH AS MUNITIONS) MANUFACTURED IN  
TURKEY TO NATO AND OTHER COUNTRIES, AND IN ENCOURAGING  
NATO ALLIES TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN THE PROVISION OF  
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

13 A.B.C.D. COUNTRY PROGRAM (\$EQUALS MILLIONS). THE PROGRAM  
IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR LEVELS AND BY FISCAL YEAR. DATA ON  
FISCAL YEARS 1977, 1978, AND 1979 ARE FOR INFORMATION  
PURPOSES. ASSUMPTIONS FOR  
FISCAL YEARS 1980, 1981 AND  
1982 ARE: THAT MAP INCLUDING IMET) WILL BE \$200 M - FY 1980,  
\$100M-FY'S 1981 AND 1982. THAT FMSCR ALLOCATIONS  
WILL BE \$250-275M FOR FY'S 1980 AND 1981, \$200-250M-  
1982. THESE ASSUMPTIONS APPLY TO ALL LEVELS.

TURKEY  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

|        | MAP | FMS | FMS | COMM | TOTAL |
|--------|-----|-----|-----|------|-------|
| SECRET |     |     |     |      |       |

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|                  | CREDIT | CASH  |
|------------------|--------|-------|
| FY 1977 ACTUAL   | 0      | 125.0 |
| FY 1978 ACTUAL   | 0      | 175.0 |
| FY 1979 PROPOSED | 0      | 175.0 |

|                  | MAP | FMS   | FMS | COMM | TOTAL |
|------------------|-----|-------|-----|------|-------|
| FY 1977 ACTUAL   | 0   | 125.0 | NA  | NA   | NA    |
| FY 1978 ACTUAL   | 0   | 175.0 | NA  | NA   | NA    |
| FY 1979 PROPOSED | 0   | 175.0 | NA  | NA   | NA    |

FY 1980 MINIMUM 63.3 142.2 205.8 8.0 419.3

INTERMEDIATE 99.8 167.5 374.8 8.0 650.1

CURRENT 167.7" 182.8" 394.1 13.6 758.2

INCREMENTAL 297.9 445.8 729.1 13.6 1,486.4

FY 1981 MINIMUM 30.5 165.5 280.8 8.0 484.8

INTERMEDIATE 59.5 181.6 487.9 8.0 737.0

CURRENT 105.5 253.9 504.9 8.0 872.3

INCREMENTAL 281.5 496.9 796.5 8.0 1,582.9

FY 1982 MINIMUM 35.0 168.2 325.4 8.0 536.6

INTERMEDIATE 85.0 178.2 511.4 13.0 787.6

CURRENT 113.0 243.7 557.4 13.0 927.1

INCREMENTAL 293.6 286.7 714.9 13.0 1,308.2

NOTE: FMS CASH AND COMMERCIAL (GOT SELF-FINANCED) PROGRAM  
DOLLARS ARE NEEDED BEFORE PROJECTED ITEMS CAN BE FULLY  
FUNDED AND DO NOT REFLECT GOT ABILITY TO PROVIDE THESE FUNDS.  
IMET IS INCLUDED IN MAP AT \$2.0 MILLION EACH YEAR.  
ASTERISKED FIGURES ARE DOLLAR VALUES BELOW ASSUMED  
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CEILINGS AT CURRENT LEVEL.

13 E. DESCRIPTION OF WHAT EACH LEVEL WILL ACCOMPLISH  
WITH RISK/BENEFIT ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF APPROVING  
THE BUDGET AT THAT LEVEL. MAP (INCLUDING IMET) AND FMS  
CREDITS.

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL

(A) DESCRIPTION. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL PROVIDES

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08  
MCE-00 DLOS-09 /120 W  
-----027535 220550Z /16

R 211315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2707  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
CSA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES  
DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

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FOR ONLY THE MOST BASIC PROGRAM NEEDS IN O & M (FMSCR),  
WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS, (MAP, FMSCR, FMS), AND  
TRANING (IMET AND FMSCR), NECESSARY TO SUPPORT EXISTING  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND NEW SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS ALREADY IN  
PROGRESS PRIOR TO FY 1980. INCLUDED IN THE MINIMUM  
PROGRAM ARE MAJOR PRIORITY ONE MSAP ITEMS UNDER MAP  
AS FOLLWS: AIRCRAFT SUPPORT (TUAF); MINE AND MINE  
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THE NATO CNTINGENCY PLANS;  
TOW LAUNCHERS AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE CONTINGENCY PROGRAM  
TO UPGRADE THE GROUND FORCES COMMAND'S (GFC'S) ANTI-  
TANK CAPABILITY; TWO MISSILES; HARPOON MISSILES TO  
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SUPPORT TURKISH NAVY'S SORE AND SEA BASED ANTI-SHIP  
MISSILE (ASM) PROGRAM; TACTICAL RADIOS FOR TUAF AND GFC  
TO REPLACE OBSOLESCEENT INVENTORIES, MOSTLY UNSUPPORTABLE;  
ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES (HAND HELD) TO PROVIDE THE NAVY AND  
GFC WITH MINIMAL POINT DEFSENS AGAINST AIR ATTACKS.

TO BE PURCHASED WITH FMSCR: F5E/F AIRCRAFT TO  
REPLACE OBSOLESCEENT F-100'S; SHORE-BASED RADARS (MOBILE)

FOR THE NAVY AND TUAF TO PROVIDE TARGET ACQUISITION FOR ANTI-SHIP AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE AGAINST THE BLACK SEA THREAT; TACTICAL RADIOS, AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES (HAND HELD); TANK MODERNIZATION, WHICH WAS DEFERRED BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO FUND IN PREVIOUS YEARS WITH NATIONAL RESOURCES. THE TURKISH FLEET OF M48 TANKS WILL NOT BE SUPPORTABLE AFTER FY 1979 IF TANK MODERNIZATION FUNDS ARE NOT PROVIDED. PROGRAMMED FUNDS WILL ONLY UPGRADE 50 PCT. OF THE M48 TANKS TO M48A3 OR A5 MODELS.

TO BE PURCHASED WITH FMS CASH OR US COMMERCIAL FUNDS: AIRCRAFT SUPPORT AND F-5E/F AIRCRAFT FOR TUAF; MOBILE SHORT-SITE HARPOON SYSTEMS AND PATROL TORPEDO BOAT HARPOON LAUNCH AND FIRING SYSTEMS (ONLY AVAILABLE COMMERCIALLY); TACTICAL RADIOS.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD CONTINUE TO LEAVE THE URGENTLY NEEDED TURKISH MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IN DIRE STRAITS, AND THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES INCAPABLE OF PERFORMING NATO ASSIGNED MISSIONS. MAJOR ITEMS OMITTED FROM FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL ARE: 20 F4E AIRCRAFT, REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE AND SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES AGAINST A NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR THREAT; COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT; M110A1E1 SP 8" HOWITZERS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE LONG RANGE ARTILLERY SUPPORT; EW EQUIPMENT  
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REQUIRED TO ENABLE THE TURKISH NAVY TO BEGIN TO MEET MINIMUM NATO STANDARDS; NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE TURKISH NIGHT FIGHTING CAPABILITY; UTILITY HELICOPTERS (TWO EQUIPPED) TO IMPROVE THE ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY; FUNDS TO CONVERT NIKE SYSTEM TO NATO STANDARDS; AND OTHER FUNDS FOR SHOP EQUIPMENT, SPARE PARTS AND SUPPORT FOR EXISTING STOCKS OF US EQUIPMENT. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL, IN ADDITION TO MAKING A NEGLIGIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM (I.E., 50 PCT. OF MAP AND MFS CREDIT WOULD BE DEVOTED TO O & M), WOULD ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT PROJECTED BASE RIGHTS NEGOTIATIONS.

## (2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL

(A) DESCRIPTION. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ADD UNDER MAP: EW EQUIPMENT (TURKISH GENERAL STAFF PROGRAM FOR ALL SERVICES); COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS TO BRING TURKISH NAVY TO NATO STANDARDS; TORPEDOES AND SPARES TO PROVIDE REQUIRED INVENTORY FOR NATO CONTINGENCIES; ACQUISITION OF 10 F4E AIRCRAFT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE AND GROUND SUPPORT AND SHOP EQUIPMENT; AIM-9J/L MISSILES; RF-4C AIRCRAFT; MOBILE TACAN.

UNDER FMSCR THE FOLLOWING: WE EQUIPMENT; COMMAND AND



CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT; TORPEDOES AND SPARES TO MEET REQUIRED NATO QUANTITIES; AIRCRAFT SUPPORT AND SHOP EQUIPMENT FOR TUAF.

UNDER FMS CASH: EW EQUIPMENT; COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT; AIRCRAFT SUPPORT AND SHOP EQUIPMENT FOR TUAF;

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TRSE-00 AID-05 IO-13 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08  
MCE-00 OMB-01 /120 W  
-----027562 220558Z /10

R 211315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2708  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
CSA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES  
DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

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F-4E AIRCRAFT; C-X AIRCRAFT; T-39 AIRCRAFT; C-130 AIRCRAFT;  
AIM-7E3 MISSILES; AIM-9J/L MISSILES; AGM-65 MISSILES;  
MISSILE SUPPORT; AND GCA UNITS.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT. EVEN IF FUNDS ARE PROVIDED  
AT THIS LEVEL, TURKISH FORCES WOULD STILL BE UNABLE TO  
EFFECTIVELY PERFORM NATO ASSIGNED MISSIONS OR TO MEET  
MINIMUM NATO STANDARDS FOR OPERATIONAL READINESS,  
EQUIPMENT MODERNITY AND STOCKAGE OF AMMUNITION AND SPARE

PARTS. AT THIS LEVEL, THE NECESSITY FOR FMS CASH AUGMENTATION BECOMES STRONGLY APPARENT.

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(3) CURRENT LEVEL.

(A) DESCRIPTION. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ADDITIONALLY PROVIDE UNDER MAP: M110A1E1 8" HOWITZERS SP REQUIRED TO PROVIDE LONG RANGE ARTILLERY SUPPORT; NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE TURKISH NIGHT FIGHTING CAPABILITY; M113A1 APC; M101A1 105 MM HOWITZERS; M109A1-B 155 MM SP; TARGET ACQUISITION RADARS; MORTAR CARRIERS; ELECTRICAL CALIBRATION EQUIPMENT FOR TUAF; FUNDS TO CONVERT NIKE SYSTEM TO NATO STANDARDS; SENSORS, LASER SCORERS; PCH&T (REQUIRES FUNDING AT ALL LEVELS).

UNDER FMSCR: UH-1H HELOS (TOW EQUIPPED) TO IMPROVE DEFICIENT ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY; APC; 155 MN HOWITZERS SP; FUNDS FOR SHIP OVERHAUL/MODERNIZATION/CONVERSION AND SUPPORT-END-ITEMS/COMPONENTS/EQUIPMENT FOR TURKISH NAVY; POWER GENERATORS FOR TUAF.

UNDER FMS CASH/US COMMERCIAL: NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT; UH-1H HELOS; 155 MM HOWITZERS SP; ARMORED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE (AIFV); ENGINEER EQUIPMENT; CONSTRUCTION AND FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT. AT THIS FUNDING LEVEL TURKISH FORCES WOULD BE CAPABLE OF MEETING MINIMUM NATO STANDARDS FOR ASSIGNED MISSIONS PROVIDED THAT SUBSEQUENT OUT-YEAR FUNDING LEVELS REMAIN COMMENSURATE WITH FORECAST MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, TURKEY'S SUSTAINED COMBAT CAPABILITY AT THIS LEVEL WOULD CONTINUE TO BE LIMITED BY SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALLS IN WRM, COMMUNICATIONS REQUIRED FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL MAINTENANCE SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS. THE CURRENT LEVEL PROGRAM REPRESENTS A SEVERELY COST CONSTRAINED FORCE, ATTAINABLE ONLY WITH A MASSIVE SELF-FINANCED EFFORT, IN ADDITION TO THE PROPOSED MAP AND FMS CREDIT FUNDING.

(4) INCREMENTAL LEVEL.

(A) DESCRIPTION. PROVIDING MAP AND FMSCR AT THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE FOR A PORTION OF THE FUNDING NECESSARY

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TO BEGIN MODERNIZATION TOWARD AN OPTIMUM FORCE TO MEET THE NATO THREAT. FAILURE TO ACQUIRE REPLACEMENT WEAPONS SYSTEMS DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAS PRODUCED A SITUATION IN WHICH OBSOLESCENCE HAS GAINED THE UPPER HAND AND WHICH CANNOT BE CORRECTED BY FORESEEABLE FUNDING IN ONLY THREE YEARS. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ALONG WITH THOSE PROJECTED IN THE PREVIOUS THREE LEVELS WOULD BEGIN TO APPROACH THE REQUIREMENTS OF A VIABLE

NATO FORCE STRUCTURE: FROM MAP FUNDS: DESTROYERS, SUBMARINES, MINE-LAYERS, AND PATROL FRIGATES FOR TURKISH NAVY; ADDITIONAL TANK MODIFICATIONS, HEAVY, MEDIUM, AND LIGHT ANTI-TANK MISSILES/WEAPONS SYSTEMS, AND HEAVY MORTARS FOR GFC. FROM FMS CREDIT: ASW AIRCRAFT (VP-X), ASW HELICOPTERS, AIRCRAFT GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, AND A MINELAYER FOR TURKISH NAVY; AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT (F-X) AND F-X SIMULATOR FOR TUAF. FROM FMS CASH: F-X AIRCRAFT, ADDITIONAL O&M, HAWK MISSILES, CHAPPARAL MISSILES, VULCAN MISSILES, AND MISSILE SUPPORT FOR TUAF.

(B) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ALLOW A DEGREE OF "CATCHING UP" IN TURKEY'S

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TRSE-00 AID-05 IO-13 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08  
MCE-00 DLOS-09 /120 W  
-----028211 220728Z /16

R 211315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2709  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
CSA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES  
DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTTEAST IZMIR

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MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. AUSTERE FUNDING FROM PREVIOUS YEARS HAS CAUSED A MASSIVE SHORTFALL IN MODERN EQUIPMENT. THERE ARE ADDITIONAL ITEMS THAT ARE NEEDED TO MEET THE WARSAW PACT THREAT; HOWEVER, AT A COST OF \$3,299.4 MILLION,

ACQUISITION WOULD APPEAR TO BE MANY YEARS IN THE FUTURE.

(5) HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES (ALL LEVELS): AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 11 ABOVE, NO HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT IS PERCEIVED AS A RESULT OF THE FOREGOING PROGRAM LEVELS AND PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES.

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F. PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS. SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANNING LEVELS ARE CONTINGENT UPON THE FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED AS WELL AS THE RELATIVE TOTAL DOLLAR AMOUNT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS ARE LESS SENSITIVE TO CHANGES IN PROGRAM LEVELS, BUT ALSO REFLECT AN INCREASED ABILITY OF TURKEY TO ASSUME THE REQUIRED SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS FOR TURKEY ARE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT (1) TURKEY ESTABLISHES A PROCUREMENT OFFICE IN CONUS BY THE END OF FY 80, AND (2) TURKISH PERSONNEL RECEIVE REQUISITE TRAINING IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT BOTH THROUGH ON-THE-JOB AND FORMAL TRAINING

SUCH AS DISAM THROUGH THE FY 80-82 PERIOD. NOTE: PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS ARE FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS ONLY AND DO NOT REFLECT PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR USCCOT/USDRT/COREP FUNCTIONS.

(A) FY 80 PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS. FUNCTIONS INCLUDE ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH: SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION; JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN (JSOP); ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE (AIASA); FIRST PLANNING YEAR; BUDGET YEAR AND BUDGET YEAR ORDERS; MAP ORDERS; DEVIATIONS; EQUIPMENT RECEIPT; MIMEX; EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES (EDA); MTT'S AND TAT'S; END ITEM UTILIZATION; SUPPORTABILITY; SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANS AND PROGRAMS; MANAGEMENT OF APPROVED FMS PROGRAMS; SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES; INDUSTRIAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES VISITS; SECURITY ASSISTANCE VISITS, INSPECTIONS, AND AUDITS; FORCE DEVELOPMENT; IMET AND ADMINISTERING ECL TESTS; PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION; INTERPRETER/TRANSLATION ACTIVITIES; MOTOR POOL MANAGEMENT; SUPPLY ADMINISTRATION; LOCAL PURCHASING; TRANSPORTATION SCHEDULING; HOUSEKEEPING REQUIREMENTS; DIVERS AND DRIVER'S

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MAINTENANCE; CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT CONTROL; COURIER AND MAIL SERVICES; REPRODUCTION SERVICES; EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE;

PUBLICATIONS MANAGEMENT; TURKISH LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION;  
MESSAGE TRAFFIC PROCESSING; GRAPHICS; BULLETIN/ROSTER  
PUBLICATION; FISCAL PROGRAM MANAGEMEN; BUDTET MANAGEMENT;  
ACCOUNTING ACTIVITIES; AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE; FLIGHT OPERA-  
TIONS; AND SPECIAL PROJECTS. THE PRIMARY EFFECT OF CHANGED  
PROGRAM LEVELS IS DUE TO INCREASE OR DECREASE IN MANHOUR  
REQUIREMENTS TO MANAGE THE MAP/GRANT AID PROGRAM.

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL MANNING.

MILITARY 34

CIVILIAN 7

LWR 23

TOTAL 64

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MANNING.

MILITARY 36

CIVILAIN 7

LWR 23

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08

MCE-00 DLOS-09 /120 W

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R 211315Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2710

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

SECDEF WASHDC

JCS WASHDC

USMISSION USNATO

USNMR SHAPE

CSA WASHDC

CNO WASHDC

CSAF WASHDC

USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES  
DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

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TOTAL 66  
(3) CURRENT LEVEL MANNING.  
MILITARY 37  
CIVILIAN 7  
LWR 24  
TOTAL 68

(4) INCREMENTAL LEVEL MANNING.  
MILITARY 38  
CIVILIAN 7  
LWR 25  
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TOTAL 70

NOTE: APPROXIMATELY EIGHT LWR SPACES CAN BE ELIMINATED IF,  
AS A RESULT OF THE EMBARGO BEING LIFTED AND/OR A NEW  
DEFENSE AGREEMENT IS RENEGOTIATED, TGS RESUMES PROVIDING  
DRIVERS FOR CJUSMMAT AND SECTION CHIEFS, AND TGS AGREES  
TO PERFORM THE MAJORITY OF REQUIRED TRANSLATION WORK NOW  
DONE BY JUSMMAT-ASSIGNED PERSONNEL.

(B) FY 81 PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS. FUNCTIONS  
REMAIN SIMILAR TO FY 80 EXCEPT THAT JUSMMAT REQUIREMENTS  
ARE REDUCED AS TURKEY ASSUMES ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS.

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL MANNING.  
MILITARY 24  
CIVILIAN 6  
LWR 20  
TOTAL 50  
(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MANNING.  
MILITARY 26  
CIVILIAN 6  
LWR 20  
TOTAL 52

(3) CURRENT LEVEL MANNING.  
MILITARY 27  
CIVILIAN 6  
LWR 21  
TOTAL 54

(4) INCREMENTAL LEVEL MANNING.

MILITARY 28  
CIVILIAN 6  
LWR 22  
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TOTAL 56

NOTE: MILITARY REDUCTIONS INCLUDE CONSOLIDATION OF SERVICE SECTIONS INTO A SINGLE FUNCTIONAL BRANCH; ONE CIVILIAN SECRETARY POSITION IS ELIMINATED; LWR REDUCTIONS INCLUDE DRIVER AND TRANSLATOR POSITIONS; APPROXIMATELY SEVEN ADDITIONAL LWR SPACES CAN BE ELIMINATED IF CONDITIONS IN THE FOREGOING FOOTNOTE APPLY.

(C) FY 82 PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS. AGAIN JUSMMAT REQUIREMENTS ARE REDUCED AS TURKEY ASSUMES ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE RESPONSIBILITIES.

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL MANNING.

MILITARY 18  
CIVILIAN 6  
LWR 17  
TOTAL 41

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MANNING.

MILITARY 20  
CIVILIAN 6  
LWR 17  
TOTAL 43

(3) CURRENT LEVEL MANNING.

MILITARY 21  
CIVILIAN 6  
LWR 18  
TOTAL 45

(4) INCREMENTAL LEVEL MANNING.

MILITARY 22  
CIVILIAN 6  
LWR 19  
TOTAL 47

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NOTE: REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY PERSONNEL CONTINUE IN RESPONSE TO REDUCED FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES; APPROXIMATELY FIVE ADDITIONAL LWR SPACES CAN BE ELIMINATED IF THE

CONDITIONS IN SUBPARAGRAPH (A) FOOTNOTE APPLY.

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TRSE-00 AID-05 IO-13 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 EB-08  
MCE-00 DLOS-09 /120 W  
-----028001 220652Z /11

R 211315Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
CSA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES  
DISAM WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

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13. G. (NOT REQUIRED AS PER REFTTEL.)

13. H. IMET LEVELS.

(A) BEST ESTIMATES FOR IMET REQUIREMENTS FOR FY  
80-82 ARES OWN BELOW. REQUIREMENTS ARE DIVIDED INTO  
CONUS AND OVERSEAS CATEGORIES AND ARE IDENTIFIED BY THREE  
TYPES: TECHNICAL TRAINING, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT OPERATION  
AND MAINTENANCE COURSES; CAREER DEVELOPMENT COURSES,  
INCLUDING SERVICE SCHOOL CAREER COURSES (SQUADRON OFFICERS'  
SCHOOL, COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, WAR COLLEGE, ETC),

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LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENNT COURSES (INCLUDING DISAM COURSES), AND AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING (ADP) AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS COURSES: AND, FLYING TRAINING, INCLUDING UNDER-GRADUATE PILOT TRAINING (UPT), T-38 AND F-5 PILOT TRAINING.

| CONUS         | FY80 | FY81 | FY82 |
|---------------|------|------|------|
| TECHNICAL TNG | 111  | 134  | 145  |
| CAREER DEVEL  | 123  | 143  | 158  |
| FLYING TNG    | 6    | 4    | 6    |
| OVERSEAS      |      |      |      |
| TECHNICAL TNG | 9    | 25   | 25   |
| TOTAL         | 249  | 306  | 334  |

(V) THE TYPES OF TRAINING AND COURSE CONTENT REQUIRED ARE NOT AVAILABLE FROM INDIGENOUS OR THRID COUNTRY COURSES. OVERSEAS TRAINING INCLUDES TECHNICAL AND MAINTENANCE COURSES THAT CAN BE PRESENTED MORE ECONOMICALLY IN GERMANY WITHIN THE USAREUR/7TH ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM. ALL TRAINING IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR OPERATIONAL READINESS AND GOT'S ASSUMPTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS. IMET IS PREFERRED OVE FMS FUNDING BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED SEVERE SHORTAGE ANTICIPATED IN FOREIGN CURRENCY EXCHANGE RESOURCES, THE PRIORITY WHICH GOT GIVES TO HARDWARE ACQUISITION OVER TRAINGING REQUIREMENTS, AND THE NEED TO ALLOCATE SCARCE TRAINING RESOURCES TO MEET THE GOALS OF OPERATIONAL READINESS AND TRANSFER OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS.

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13. I. EMBASSY ESTIMATE OF PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS: THE PROGRAM LEVELS DEFINED ABOVE WERE FORMULATED IN CLOSE CONSULATATION WITH THE EMBASSY STAFF. WE FULLY SUPPORT THE CURRENT PROGRAM LEVELS OF FY 80, 81 AND 82 (IE, FY 80: \$167.7 MILLION IN MAP, \$182.8 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS; FY 81: \$105.5 MILLION IM MAP, \$253.9 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS; AND FY 82: \$113 MILLION IN MAP, \$243.7 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS) AS THE LOWEST PROGRAM LEVEL WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE US TO MEET THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 1, ABOVE. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE USG SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO FUNDING AT LEAST SOME ELEMETS OF THE

INCREMENTAL PROGRAMS FOR THESE YEARS IN ORDER TO MEET  
PRESSING MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE TURKISH ARMED  
FORCES IN THE PURSUIT OF NATO FORCE OBJECTIVES. IN THIS  
CONNECTION, IT IS EXPECTED THAT MAP AND FMS PROGRAM  
LEVELS WILL BE ADDRESSED BY BOTH THE US AND TURKISH  
GOVERNMENTS AS NEGOTIATIONS ARE INITIATED FOR A NEW  
BASE RIGHTS AGREEMENT SUBSEQUENT TO REPEAL OF THE  
ARMS EMBARGO.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 21 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978ANKARA05320  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780300-0616  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** ANKARA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780735/aaaabdmw.tel  
**Line Count:** 1799  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** fcfb146f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 33  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 STATE 167901  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 13 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1931975  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  
**TAGS:** MASS, TU  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbs://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/fcfb146f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014